
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300(AP)Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific Security Target V1.01
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8.2. Security Requirements Rationale
8.2.1.
Security Functional Requirements Rationale
(1) Necessity
Relations between security functional requirements and security objectives are described in Table
15.
Each TOE security functional requirement corresponds to at least one security objective.
Incorrect subject does not exist in TOE.
Table 15: Correspondences between Security Functional Requirements and Security Objectives
Security objective
Security functional
requirement
O.RESIDUAL
O.MANAGE
O.DECIPHER
FCS_CKM.1 O
FCS_COP.1 O
FDP_RIP.1 O
FIA_AFL.1 O
FIA_UID.2 O
FIA_UAU.2 O
FIA_UAU.7 O
FMT_MOF.1 (1) O
FMT_MOF.1 (2) O
FMT_MOF.1 (3) O
FMT_MTD.1(1) O
FMT_MTD.1(2) O
FMT_MTD.1(3) O
FMT_SMF.1 O
FMT_SMR.1 O
FPT_RVM.1 O O O
O: Functional requirement for TOE
(2) Sufficiency
Table 16 describes that the functional requirements assures all the security objectives for TOE.
Table 16: Sufficiency of Objectives
Security objective Functional
requirement
Sufficiency
O.RESIDUAL FDP_RIP.1
FPT_RVM.1
By the following security functional requirements, the security
objective
O.RESIDUAL in which TOE makes the recovery of used
document data stored on the hard disk drive impossible can be
realized by overwriting:
-
FDP_RIP.1
By
FDP_RIP.1, the previous information of the used document
data file stored on the hard disk drive is made unavailable.
-
FPT_RVM.1
By
FPT_RVM.1, TOE security functions are certainly invoked and
not bypassed.
O.DECIPHER FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1
By the following security functional requirements, the security
objective
O.DECIPHER in which TOE makes the parsing of used
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